Matching with Generalized Sequential Reserves

Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper introduces a general theory of sequential reserves by formulating a parameterized family of generalized sequential (GS) choice rules for institutions consisting of multiple divisions (or reserve categories). We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism when institutions' choice rules are in the GS family. Choice rules in real-life market design applications appear naturally in the GS family. We present two such real-world applications: affirmative action implementations in India and Chinese high school admissions.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2025-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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