Matching with Generalized Sequential Choice Rules

Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies a many-to-one matching between individuals and institutions where institutions comprise multiple divisions and face cross-divisional constraints. We introduce a parametrized family of choice rules, which we call generalized sequential (GSq), that encompasses many different choice rules encountered in practice and in market design literature. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in a matching problem where all institutions have a GSq choice rule. We present two real-world applications in which choice rules in the GSq family emerge naturally: affirmative action in India's public higher educational institutions and government jobs, and high school admissions in China.

Date: 2023-10, Revised 2026-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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