EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Paying for Privacy: Pay-or-Tracking Walls

Timo Mueller-Tribbensee, Klaus M. Miller and Bernd Skiera

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Prestigious news publishers, and more recently, Meta, have begun to request that users pay for privacy. Specifically, users receive a notification banner, referred to as a pay-or-tracking wall, that requires them to (i) pay money to avoid being tracked or (ii) consent to being tracked. These walls have invited concerns that privacy might become a luxury. However, little is known about pay-or-tracking walls, which prevents a meaningful discussion about their appropriateness. This paper conducts several empirical studies and finds that top EU publishers use pay-or-tracking walls. Their implementations involve various approaches, including bundling the pay option with advertising-free access or additional content. The price for not being tracked exceeds the advertising revenue that publishers generate from a user who consents to being tracked. Notably, publishers' traffic does not decline when implementing a pay-or-tracking wall and most users consent to being tracked; only a few users pay. In short, pay-or-tracking walls seem to provide the means for expanding the practice of tracking. Publishers profit from pay-or-tracking walls and may observe a revenue increase of 16.4% due to tracking more users than under a cookie consent banner.

Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.03610 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Paying for Privacy: Pay-or-Tracking Walls (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Paying for Privacy: Pay-or-Tracking Walls (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2403.03610

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2403.03610