Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models

Nadia Gui\~naz\'u, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

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Abstract: This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise stability. We also examine their relationship to established notions in the literature, such as worker-quasi and firm-quasi stability in both many-to-one and many-to-many markets.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mac
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