Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment
Doron Sayag,
Avichai Snir and
Daniel Levy ()
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We test the predictions of the sticky information model using a survey dataset by comparing shoppers accuracy in recalling the prices of regulated and comparable unregulated products. Because regulated product prices are capped, they are sold more than comparable unregulated products, while their prices change less frequently and vary less across stores and between brands, than the prices of comparable unregulated products. Therefore, shoppers would be expected to recall the regulated product prices more accurately. However, we find that shoppers are better at recalling the prices of unregulated products, in line with the sticky information model which predicts that shoppers will be more attentive to prices that change more frequently.
Date: 2025-02
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Citations:
Published in Economics Letters (Forthcoming), 2025
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.15974 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025) 
Journal Article: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025) 
Working Paper: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025) 
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025) 
Working Paper: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025) 
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025) 
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025) 
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