Selling Certification, Content Moderation, and Attention

Heski Bar-Isaac, Rahul Deb and Matthew Mitchell

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Abstract: We introduce a model of content moderation for sale, where a platform can channel attention in two ways: direct steering that makes content visible to consumers and certification that controls what consumers know about the content. The platform optimally price discriminates using both instruments. Content from higher willingness-to-pay providers enjoys higher quality certification and more views. The platform cross-subsidizes content: the same certificate is assigned to content from low willingness-to-pay providers that appeals to consumers and content from higher willingness-to-pay providers that does not. Cross-subsidization can benefit consumers by making content more diverse; regulation enforcing accurate certification may be harmful.

Date: 2025-06
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