Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion

Yaron Azrieli and Rachana Das

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver's updating rule systematically distorts Bayesian posteriors. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information sequentially is never valuable, we show that the sender gains from sequential persuasion in several of the environments considered in the literature on strategic information transmission. Our proofs are constructive and reveal how properties of the bias interact with the payoff environment to make dynamic persuasion beneficial.

Date: 2025-08, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-inv and nep-mic
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