Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice

Georgy Lukyanov and Anna Vlasova

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized, update reputation. We show a unique cutoff equilibrium and continuity. Under a relative-diagnosticity condition, the experimentation threshold is increasing in reputation ("playing it safe at the top"). Comparative statics are clean, and success-contingent bonuses map one-to-one into experimentation while gatekeeping scales implemented experimentation and learning.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.04036 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2509.04036

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().