Credible Scores

Jacopo Bizzotto and Nathan Hancart

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Expert and decision-maker share the same quadratic-loss utility function. We show that the use of simple language introduces strategic considerations. First, equilibrium payoffs may be lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Additionally, any equilibrium score must be either linear or discrete. Finally, for normally distributed states, the set of equilibrium linear scores includes only the ex-ante best and worst linear scores.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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