Simple Communication

Jacopo Bizzotto and Nathan Hancart

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, the use of simple language introduces strategic frictions. As a result, equilibrium payoffs may be lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Additionally, under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state or discrete. Finally, for normally distributed states, we characterize the set of equilibrium linear scores and show that it consists of the ex-ante best and worst linear scores.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.09621 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2509.09621

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().