Token Is All You Price

Weijie Zhong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A seller of a dynamic information service under an information-throughput constraint screens buyers who privately differ in urgency. We characterize the revenue-optimal mechanism: deploy a single preference-aligned belief process; screen buyers with a menu of stopping-time caps. The result rationalizes tokenized GenAI pricing, from consumer subscription tiers to B2B API service tiers. Extensions to heterogeneous valuations and endogenous reasoning quality preserve the qualitative conclusions.

Date: 2025-10, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pay
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