Pricing Access to Dynamic Information Services

Weijie Zhong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A provider sells a \emph{dynamic information service}---a real-time, capacity-constrained process that resolves a customer's uncertainty---to customers who differ privately in urgency. I characterize the revenue-optimal mechanism: deploy a \emph{single}, undistorted information process---the one a customer with unlimited access would most prefer---and screen entirely through a one-dimensional menu of service caps. The provider leaves the product itself undistorted, unlike a Mussa--Rosen monopolist; all screening is absorbed into the cap. The mechanism rationalizes a recurring contractual form---a flat fee for capped access to a common process---spanning AI service tiers, expert-network consultations, and analyst-inquiry retainers. I identify the economic force behind the result, a convexity-preservation property of urgency screening, and give conditions under which the per-unit price declines in the cap.

Date: 2025-10, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pay
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