The Moroccan Public Procurement Game

Nizar Riane

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we establish the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying an extended version of Dasgupta and Maskin result, which allows us to extend equilibrium existence to the mixed-strategy setting despite payoff discontinuities.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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