Multidimensional Sequential Screening

Eric Gao

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study multidimensional sequential screening. A monopolist contracts with a buyer who privately observes information about the distribution of their eventual valuations for multiple goods. After initial private information is reported and the contract is signed, the buyer learns and reports realized valuations. In these settings, the monopolist frontloads surplus extraction: Any information rents given to the buyer to elicit their true valuations can be extracted in expectation before those valuations are drawn, transforming the multidimensional screening problem by distorting buyer information rents compared to static screening. If the buyer's distributions over valuations are commonly FOSD ordered, regular for each good, and satisfy invariant dependencies (valuations can be dependent across goods, but how valuations are coupled cannot vary), the optimal mechanism coincides with independently offering the optimal sequential screening mechanism for each good. This rationalizes membership payments followed by separate sales schemes commonly used in practice.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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