Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations
Orhan Ayg\"un and
Bertan Turhan
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We study the design of affirmative action mechanisms, focusing on India's system of horizontal reservations within vertical reservations. We consider a one-to-all policy, under which an applicant eligible for multiple horizontal categories simultaneously contributes toward each category's minimum guarantee. When horizontal reservations have a hierarchical structure, we introduce a choice rule that selects the unique merit-optimal set of applicants subject to these guaranties, satisfies the substitutes condition and size monotonicity. In a matching-with-contracts framework, we show that the generalized deferred acceptance mechanism is stable, strategy-proof, and eliminates justified envy under aggregate choice rules using the hierarchical choice rule in each vertical category. We establish a fundamental trade-off between merit and affirmative action between the one-to-all and one-to-one counting policies.
Date: 2026-02, Revised 2026-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Working Paper: Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations (2026) 
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