Hippocratic Utility and Status Quo Bias

Tomasz Strzalecki

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A utility function has been proposed that values more lives that are lost than those that are saved. I do not dispute the ethical motivation behind this kind of asymmetry. However, I show with a simple example that the scope of applicability of such a decision criterion is considerably more limited than it may first appear.

Date: 2026-03, Revised 2026-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-upt
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