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Moral Consumers and the Environment

Mogens Fosgerau and J\"orgen Weibull

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Abstract: We study the taxation of environmentally harmful goods when consumers have a Kantian desire to ``do the right thing''. A consumer evaluates her buying strategy, a rule that specifies whether to buy, by the material payoff she would obtain if others followed the same rule with a probability given by her degree of morality. Equilibrium exists and is unique in finite populations with heterogeneous morality. The optimal tax depends crucially on whether consumers are aware that tax revenue is returned to them. If they are, the Pigovian tax is optimal under homogeneous morality, whatever consumers know about environmental costs, and we give conditions under which it remains the unique optimum under heterogeneous morality. If they are not, the optimal tax is lower, and more so the more moral consumers are. Under a quota system such as the EU Emissions Trading System, any cap at least as stringent as the Pigovian quota admits an equilibrium in which morality has no effect on consumers who are aware of the system.

Date: 2026-11
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