Welfare Benefits in Highly Decentralized Fiscal Systems: Evidence on Interregional Mimicking

Luis Ayala, Ana Herrero-Alcade and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ()
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Ana Herrero-Alcade: Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, ES

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically, we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households.

Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-ure
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https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2021/03/21-07-Interreg ... tralized-Welfare.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2107

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