Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Paula Jaramillo and Flip Klijn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Çağatay Kayı

No 610, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; fairness; indivisible good; land restitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2014)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2012)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2012)
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