Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

No 9381, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate theother. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Keywords: Fairness; strategy-proofness; indivisible good; land restitution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2012-03-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/10842/9381.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2015)
Journal Article: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2014)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:009381

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Facultad de Economía ().