Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 3, 603-633

Abstract: We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2015)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2012)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8

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