An Experimental Study of Persuasion Bias and Social Influence in Networks

Roberto Weber and Jordi Brandts
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ayça Ebru Giritligil ()

No 829, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In many areas of social life, individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources. When these sources are connected through a network, then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network. The inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions. In our experiment, four agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all. Agents receive private signals about the parameter and can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network, the structure of which is known by all players. We present results from experiments with three different networks. We find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than under optimal updating. Our results are consistent with the model of "persuasion bias" of DeMarzo et al. (2003).

Keywords: experiments; bounded rationality; persuasion bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An experimental study of persuasion bias and social influence in networks (2015)
Working Paper: An Experimental Study of Persuasion Bias and Social Influence in Networks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:829

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