Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria

Mitchell Hoffman, Maria Lombardi and Gianmarco León-Ciliotta
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gianmarco León-Ciliotta ()

No 856, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing all state and national elections since World War II, we show that compulsory voting laws with mild sanctions decreased abstention by roughly 50%. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or the political equilibrium. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and are uninformed.

Keywords: fiscal policy; incentives to vote; compulsory voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria (2017)
Working Paper: Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:856

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