EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria

Mitchell Hoffman, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta () and María Lombardi

No 22221, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949-2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and be uninformed.

JEL-codes: D72 H10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2016-05
Note: LE LS PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Published as Hoffman, Mitchell & León, Gianmarco & Lombardi, María, 2017. "Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 103-115.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22221.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22221

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22221

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-17
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22221