Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon
Michalis Drouvelis,
Bilal Malaeb,
Michael Vlassopoulos and
Jackline Wahba
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Abstract:
Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public goods game without and with punishment. We randomly assign participants to Lebanese-only, Syrian-only, or mixed sessions. We find that randomly formed pairs in homogeneous sessions, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than those in mixed sessions, suggesting in-group cooperation is stronger. These patterns are driven by Lebanese participants. Further analysis indicates that behavior in mixed groups is more strongly conditioned on expectations about the partner’s cooperation than in homogeneous groups.
Keywords: refugees; public goods game; cooperation; punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 F22 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/20-28.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation in a fragmented society: Experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon (2021)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon (2019)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:20-28
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