Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon

Michalis Drouvelis, Bilal Malaeb, Michael Vlassopoulos and Jackline Wahba

No 12858, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that homogeneous groups, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than mixed groups. These patterns are driven by the Lebanese participants. Our findings suggest that it is equally important to provide adequate help to the host communities to alleviate any economic and social pressures.

Keywords: public good game; cooperation; refugees; punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 F22 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021, 187, 176-191.

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp12858.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation in a fragmented society: Experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon (2021)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon (2020)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12858

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().