Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models

Hervé Crès and Utku Unver

No 716, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1 − 1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d

Keywords: Spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2006)
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Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
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