Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

Hervé Crès and Utku Unver

No 818, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case" scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d

Keywords: spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2006-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2008)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%: Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%: Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
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