Ideology and existence of 50%: Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

Hervé Crès and Utku Unver

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice conÞguration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1−1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d

Date: 2005-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models (2010)
Working Paper: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2008)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2006)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%: Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
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