Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.

JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2013)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp828

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