Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 94, issue C, 172-182

Abstract: We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

Keywords: Non-standard subject pools; Prisoner's dilemma; Peer punishment; Artifactual field experiment; Stranger matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268112002831
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2012)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:94:y:2013:i:c:p:172-182

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.024

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().