Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

No 7051, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

Keywords: artefactual field experiment; peer punishment; prisoner's dilemma; non-standard subject pools; stranger matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, 94, 172-182

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2013)
Working Paper: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2012)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
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