Shallow Meritocracy

Peter Andre

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Meritocracies aspire to reward hard work but promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances into which they were born. However, the choice to work hard is often shaped by circumstances. I show that people’s merit judgments are insensitive to circumstances’ effect on choice. In an experiment, US participants judge how much money workers deserve for the effort they exert. Unequal circumstances discourage some workers from working hard. Nonetheless, participants hold disadvantaged workers responsible for their choices. Participants reward the effort of disadvantaged and advantaged workers identically, regardless of the circumstances under which choices are made. Additional experiments identify an important underlying mechanism. Individuals understand that choices are influenced by circumstances. But, in light of an uncertain counterfactual state – what exactly would have happened on a level playing field – individuals base their merit judgments on the only reliable evidence they possess: observed effort levels. I confirm these patterns in a structural model of fairness views. Finally, a vignette study shows that merit judgments can be similarly “shallow” when choices are shaped by racism or poverty.

Keywords: Meritocracy; fairness; responsibility; attitudes toward inequality; redistribution; social preferences; inference; uncertainty; counterfactual thinking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D91 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 89
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Shallow Meritocracy (2022)
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