Shallow Meritocracy
Peter Andre
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany
Abstract:
Meritocracies aspire to reward hard work but promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances into which they were born. However, circumstances often shape the choice to work hard. I show that people’s merit judgments are insensitive to this effect. They hold others responsible for their choices, even if these choices have been shaped by unequal circumstances. In an experiment, US participants judge how much money workers deserve for the effort they exert. Unequal circumstances disadvantage some workers and discourage them from working hard. Nonetheless, participants reward the effort of disadvantaged and advantaged workers identically, regardless of the circumstances under which choices are made. For some participants, this reflects their fundamental view on fair rewards. For others, the neglect results from the uncertain counterfactual. They understand that unequal circumstances shape choices but do not correct for this because the exact counterfactual—what would have happened under equal circumstances—remains uncertain.
Keywords: Meritocracy; fairness; responsibility; attitudes toward inequality; redistribution; social preferences; inference; uncertainty; counterfactual thinking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D91 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Shallow Meritocracy (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_318v3
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