Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore

Huailu Li, Kevin Lang and Kaiwen Leong ()
Additional contact information
Kaiwen Leong: Nanyang Technological University

No dp-275, Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamondís hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite an excess supply of workers, but consistent with their self-reported attitudes and beliefs, sex workers charge Caucasians (Bangladeshis) more (less), based on perceived willingness to pay, and are more (less) likely to approach and reach an agreement with them. Consistent with taste discrimination, they avoid Indians, charge more and reach an agreement with them less frequently.

JEL-codes: J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mkt and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore (2018)
Working Paper: Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore (2015)
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