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Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore

Huailu Li, Kevin Lang and Kaiwen Leong

No 20911, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is highly competitive. Clients can search legally at negligible cost. Sex workers discriminate based on client ethnicity despite an excess supply of sex workers. Workers are more (less) likely to approach and ask a higher (lower) price of Caucasians (Bangladeshis), based on their perceived willingness to pay. They avoid Indians, set a significantly higher price and are less likely to reach an agreement with them, suggesting that Indians face taste discrimination. These findings remain even after controlling for prostitute fixed effects and are consistent with the workers' self-reported attitudes and beliefs.

JEL-codes: J7 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-lma and nep-sea
Note: DEV LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Huailu Li & Kevin Lang & Kaiwen Leong, 2018. "Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore," The Economic Journal, vol 128(611), pages 1570-1608.

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Journal Article: Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore (2018) Downloads
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