Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore

Huailu Li, Kevin Lang and Kaiwen Leong

Economic Journal, 2018, vol. 128, issue 611, 1570-1608

Abstract: The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamond's hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite an excess supply of workers, but consistent with their self†reported attitudes and beliefs, sex workers charge whites (Bangladeshis) more (less), based on perceived willingness to pay, and are more (less) likely to approach and reach an agreement with them. Consistent with taste discrimination, they avoid Indians, charge more and reach an agreement with them less frequently.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12476

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore (2015)
Working Paper: Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore
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