Competing for Ownership

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

No WP2007-003, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a tractable model of the allocation of control in firms in competitive markets, which permits us to study how changes in the scarcity of assets, skills or liquidity in the market translate into control inside the organization. Firms will be more integrated when the terms of trade are more favorable to the short side of the market, when liquidity is unequally distributed among existing firms and following a uniform increase in productivity. The model identifies a price-like mechanism whereby local liquidity or productivity shocks propagate and lead to widespread organizational restructuring.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Competing for Ownership (2008)
Working Paper: Competing for ownership (2008)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2004)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2000)
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