Competing for ownership

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We develop a tractable model of the allocation of ownership and control within firms operating in competitive markets. The model shows how scarcity in the market translates into ownership structure inside the organization. It identifies a price-like mechanism whereby local liquidity or productivity shocks propagate, leading to widespread organizational restructuring. Among the model's predictions: firms will become more integrated when the terms of trade become more favorable to yhe short side of the market, when the liquidity of the poorest firm increases sufficiently relative to the mean, and following a uniform increase in productivity. Shocks to the first two moments of the liquidity distribution have multiplier effects on the corresponding moments of the distribution of ownership structures.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in: European Economic Association. Journal (2008) v.6 n° 6,p.1273-1308

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing for Ownership (2008)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2004)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2000)
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