Competing for Ownership

Andrew Newman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Patrick Legros

No 2573, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We provide a simple framework for analysing how organizations are designed in a competitive economy. We focus on the allocation of rights of control and show that in the presence of liquidity constraints, transferring authority can serve as an effective means of transferring surplus, although this may entail some efficiency loss. The efficiency and organizational structure of a typical firm will depend on the liquidity of the ?marginal? agent in the market and not just on the liquidity and technology of the members of the firm. Liquidity changes in a small fraction of the population can lead to restructuring of ownership throughout the economy.

Keywords: Contract theory; Mergers; Ownership; Shocks to distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D31 G34 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing for Ownership (2008)
Working Paper: Competing for ownership (2008)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Competing for Ownership (2004)
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