Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership
Ting Liu (),
Ching-to Ma () and
Henry Mak ()
Additional contact information
Ting Liu: Stony Brook University
Henry Mak: Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
No wp2015-006, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
A Principal would like low-benefit projects to be serviced by a low-cost-low-productivity expert and high- benefit projects, by a high-cost-high-productivity expert. Experts derive intrinsic or extrinsic motivational benefits from providing services, but must earn minimum profits. The Principal lacks information about project benefits and experts' motivations, which are both known to experts. Experts form a Partnership, which sets up a gatekeeping-referral protocol and a corresponding sharing rule. We show that the Principal can implement the first best by a single contract with the Partnership. The contract is quasi-linear, consisting of a lump sum, and a partial reimbursement of experts' incurred costs.
Keywords: Motivated Experts; Principal; Multiagent; Partnership; Referral (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D02 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Journal Article: Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership (2018)
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2015-006
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().