Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership
Ching-to Ma () and
No WP2018-002, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics
A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts' private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts' priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership.
Keywords: Motivated Experts; Principal; Multiagent Incentives; Partnership; Gatekeeping; Sharing Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D02 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Journal Article: Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership (2018)
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2018-002
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().