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Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership

Ting Liu, Ching-to Ma () and Henry Mak

No WP2018-002, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts' private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts' priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership.

Keywords: Motivated Experts; Principal; Multiagent Incentives; Partnership; Gatekeeping; Sharing Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D02 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
Date: 2017-10
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Journal Article: Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership (2015) Downloads
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