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Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership

Ting Liu, Ching-to Ma and Henry Y. Mak

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 152, issue C, 296-313

Abstract: A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts’ private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts’ priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership.

Keywords: Motivated experts; Principal; Multiagent incentives; Partnership; Gatekeeping; Sharing rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D02 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:296-313

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.003

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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