European antitrust control and standard setting
Mario Mariniello ()
Working Papers from Bruegel
Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the...
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bre:wpaper:768
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