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European antitrust control and standard setting

Mario Mariniello ()

Working Papers from Bruegel

Abstract: Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the...

Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hme, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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