Working Papers

From Brown University, Department of Economics
Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
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2010-15: Social Networks and Unraveling in Labor Markets

Itay Fainmesser

2010-14: Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games in Networks Approach

Itay Fainmesser

2010-13: Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment

Loukas Dalafoutas, Martin Kocher, Louis Putterman and Matthias Sutter

2010-12: The Demographic Transition: Causes and Consequences

Oded Galor

2010-11: Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values

Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano

2010-10: Regret Matching with Finite Memory

Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano

2010-9: Evaluating the Effects of Large Scale Health Interventions in Developing Countries: The Zambian Malaria Initiative

Nava Ashraf, Günther Fink and David Weil

2010-8: Partial Idendification of Wage Effects of Training Programs

Michael Lechner and Blaise Melly

2010-7: The "Out of Africa" Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Ecomomic Development

Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor

2010-6: Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation

Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

2010-5: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

2010-4: Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information

Geoffroy de Clippel

2010-3: Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance"

Geoffroy de Clippel

2010-2: A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies

Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

2010-1: Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran and Kenju Kamei

2009-13: Recent Trends in the Earnings of New Immigrants to the United States

George Borjas and Rachel Friedberg

2009-12: Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies

Yusuke Kamishiro and Roberto Serrano

2009-11: Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

2009-10: 2008 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture ñComparative Economic Development: Insights from Unified Growth Theory

Oded Galor

2009-9: Isolation and Development

Quamrul Ashraf, Oded Galor and Ömer Özak

2009-8: Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space

J. Vernon Henderson, Adam Storeygard and David Weil

2009-7: Pet Overpopulation: An Economic Analysis

Stephen Coate and Brian Knight

2009-6: No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems

Geoffroy de Clippel and Camelia Bejan

2009-5: Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott

Geoffroy de Clippel

2009-4: Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz

2009-3: Inequality and Economic Development: An Overview

Oded Galor

2009-2: A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS

Roland Pongou and Roberto Serrano

2009-1: Cores of Combined Games

Francis Bloch and Geoffroy de Clippel

2008-16: Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin

Geoffroy de Clippel and Roberto Serrano

2008-15: Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequity

Louis Putterman and David Weil

2008-14: Dynamics and Stagnation in the Malthusain Epoch

Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor

2008-8: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

Allan M Feldman and Roberto Serrano

2008-7: When Does Improving Health Raise GDP?

Quamrul Ashraf, Ashley Lester and David Weil

2008-6: Malthusian Population Dynamics: Theory and Evidence

Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor

2008-5: Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies

Yusuke Kamishiro and Roberto Serrano

2008-4: Towards a Unified Theory of Economic Growth: Oded Galor on the Transition from Malthusian Stagnation to Modern Economic Growth

Brian Snowdon

2008-3: Human Genetic Diversity and Comparative Economic Development

Oded Galor and Quamrul Ashraf

2008-2: Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence

Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford

2008-1: Getting Punnishment Right: Do Costly Monitoring or Redustributive Punishment Help?

Talbot Page, Louis Putterman and Bruno Garcia

2007-15: Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Non-binding Communication in a Trust Experiment

Avner Ben-Ner, Louis Putterman and Ting Ren

2007-14: The Neolithic Revolution and Contemporary Variations in Life Expectancy

Oded Galor and Omer Moav

2007-13: Preferences For Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study

Ruben Durante and Louis Putterman

2007-12: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

Allan M Feldman and Roberto Serrano

2007-11: Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value

Roberto Serrano

2007-10: Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics

Roberto Serrano and Antonio Cabrales

2007-9: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy

Pedro Dal Bó, Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman

2007-8: Multiple Growth Regimes-Insights from Unified Growth Theory

Oded Galor

2007-7: The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Pedro Dal Bó and Guillaume Frechette

2007-6: Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine

Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

2007-4: Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis

Stefan Grosse, Louis Putterman and Bettina Rockenbach