The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

Aidt S. Toke, Facundo Albornoz and Martin Gassebner

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Keywords: political transitions; autocracy; democracy; international financial institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F53 F59 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1241.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The golden hello and political transitions (2018)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Halo and Political Transitions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1241

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