The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

Toke Aidt, Facundo Albornoz and Martin Gassebner

No 12-316, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: We analyze the in uence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Keywords: Political transitions; Democracy; Autocracy; IMF; World Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2012-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-007554467 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The golden hello and political transitions (2018)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Halo and Political Transitions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kof:wpskof:12-316

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