Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework

Andrei Medvedev

No 07-16, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: To prevent possible abuse of market power, an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divestiture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchaser of the assets (e.g. to exclude an incumbent from the auction), then it could lead to a favourable outcome for consumers and merging firms.

Keywords: Merger regulation; structural remedies; divestiture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2007)
Working Paper: Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework (2004)
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-16

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