Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework

Andrei Medvedev

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: To prevent possible abuse of market power in the future an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divesture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchase of the assets, then it could lead to a favorable outcome for consumers and merging firms.

Keywords: Merger regulation; Structural remedies; Efficiency; Auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2007)
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2007)
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2004)
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