Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework

Andrei Medvedev

No 2007-16, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: To prevent possible abuse of market power, an antitrust agency can force merging ï¬ rms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divesture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisï¬ es a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchaser of the assets (e.g. to exclude an incumbent from the auction), then it could lead to a favourable outcome for consumers and merging ï¬ rms.

Keywords: merger regulation; structural remedies; divesture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2007)
Working Paper: Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework (2004)
Working Paper: Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework (2004)
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