Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy"

Larry Karp and Thierry Paul

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy".

Keywords: Unemployment; government subsidies; wage bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4w19p9qp.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment and the 'Labour-Management Conspiracy.' (2000)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy" (1998)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy" (1998)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the 'Labour-Management Conspiracy' (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt4w19p9qp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().