Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy"

Larry Karp and Thierry Paul

No 25040, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy".

Keywords: Labor; and; Human; Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25040/files/wp980841.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment and the 'Labour-Management Conspiracy.' (2000)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy" (1998)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy" (1998)
Working Paper: Unemployment and the 'Labour-Management Conspiracy' (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:25040

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25040

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().