Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

Petra Geraats ()

Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series from Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become very transparent. This paper provides an explanation for this puzzling fact, focusing on the disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and gives the central bank greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Furthermore, it makes it easier for a central bank to build reputation. To achieve these benefits of transparency it is generally necessary to publish the conditional central bank forecasts for both inflation and output.

Keywords: transparency; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0hw7h7cp.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2001)
Working Paper: Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ciders:qt0hw7h7cp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series from Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().